Ukraine War Economy Tracker

The Economy Tracker provides regular updates on the state of Ukraine’s economy during the war, bringing together key indicators and charts in one place. Sections are updated on a rolling basis to reflect the latest data.

You may also be interested in our Monthly Economic Reviews, which feature a focused topic and bring together key experts for discussions.

After a 28.8% contraction in 2022, the economy rebounded by 5.5% in 2023. In 2024, GDP growth amounted to only 2.9% y-o-y, below expectations. The economic recovery is gradually slowing.

In 2025, real GDP grew by 1.8%. Most forecasts had expected a stronger outcome (the average estimate of non-government analysts was +2% in 2025). The weaker recovery reflected Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

In Q1 2026, real GDP fell for the first time since 2023 — by 0.5% y-o-y or 0.7% q-o-q (seasonally adjusted). GDP declined due to the energy crisis caused by Russian attacks on energy infrastructure.

Prices continued to rise faster than last year. In April 2026, prices increased by 1.4% (after 1.7% in March). In annual terms, inflation accelerated from 7.9% in March to 8.6% in April. Ukraine entered the full-scale war with consumer inflation at around 10% y-o-y.

Inflation continues to be driven primarily by higher fuel and transport costs, as well as — with a lag — the jump in electricity tariffs for businesses in January–February, which is already beginning to feed through into prices, alongside the effect of the hryvnia’s depreciation. Under these conditions, the NBU will keep the policy rate at least at its current level to prevent CPI from exceeding 10% y-o-y — a psychological threshold of “normality” that is now widely used. On the other hand, it will become even easier for the Ministry of Finance to meet its revenue targets amid the real erosion of expenditures. To avoid an even sharper acceleration in inflation in the autumn, it is now critical to help farmers complete the sowing campaign properly and apply fertilisers.

The NBU kept the key policy rate at 15% at the Monetary Policy Committee meeting on 30 April 2026. The NBU postponed easing due to rising inflation risks and expectations at the start of 2026. It also stated that it stands ready to raise the rate if needed.

In April 2026, Ukraine’s FX reserves fell by 7.3% to $48.2 bn. Over the month, the NBU carried out FX interventions $3.6 bn to support the hryvnia exchange rate. Another $1 bn went to debt servicing and repayments.

At the same time, FX reserves received $378 mn: $339 mn from the placement of FX-denominated domestic government bonds and $39 mn from the World Bank. Revaluation increased the value of financial instruments by another $378 mn. These $756 mn were not enough to fully offset FX outflows, and reserves declined.

The current record-high level of reserves covers 4.9 months of future imports (compared with the 3-month benchmark).

Since the second half of October, the dollar exchange rate — both the NBU’s official rate and the cash market rate — has started to rise and has crossed UAH 42/$. This depreciation is controlled, as the NBU maintains a regime of managed flexibility, intervening in the market to prevent large fluctuations. Sharp swings are unlikely given the adequate level of FX reserves, which allow these interventions to continue.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, all domestic revenues of Ukraine’s state budget have gone to finance defence; these expenditures account for roughly half of the budget. Ukraine finances all civilian state budget expenditures with foreign financial assistance — in 2026, the need for such external financing is about $50 bn.

In 2026, Ukraine has already launched a new cooperation programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and received the first credit tranche of $1.5 bn. Ukraine also continues to receive funds under the ERA programme (financed from proceeds generated by frozen Russian assets) — $5.1 bn already in 2026.

In 2025, foreign aid covered 56% of Ukraine’s additional state budget needs, down from 73% in 2024. In 2025, the main source of external financing was the ERA programme — a mechanism for transferring proceeds from frozen Russian assets. In 2026, financing from the European Union under a large €90 bn loan will be crucial for Ukraine.

The fuel crisis have a minor impact on state budget revenues in March; the greatest impact was on import VAT.

Total tax revenues amounted to UAH 244 bn, almost +UAH 30 b y-o-y. Half of this growth came from import VAT.

In March, petroleum products worth UAH 21 bn were imported, +UAH 3.8 bn m-o-m, due to increase in reserves for fuel and higher prices.

By contrast, domestic VAT revenues decreased both m-o-m (-5%) and y-o-y (-11.5%) due to growth in budget refunds and greater import reliance.

The impact of the fuel crisis on income taxation has been limited so far. The crisis may affect economic expectations and worsen economic activity, which could impact income tax revenues. In March, however, these revenues increased and exceeded the target: CPT increased m-o-m (+541%) due to its seasonality and exceeded the plan (+8%); PIT increased both m-o-m (+4%) and y-o-y (+23%) and exceeded the plan (+5%).

In February 2026, state budget expenditures totalled UAH 372 bn, +30% m-o-m.

War needs remained the main driver. War expenditures via own sources: UAH 189 bn compared UAH 153 bn in January.

In-kind military support increased 1.5 times m-o-m.

Non-military spending – uneven monthly growth: economic activity: UAH 2.9 bn → UAH 9.6 bn due to funds allocated to National Development Institution (5-7-9%)​ and road debt repayments. Healthcare: UAH 7.1 bn → UAH 21.8 due to delays till February in contracting healthcare facilities under the state-guaranteed health insurance programme.

However, total expenditures fell by 10% y-o-y. Both war-related expenditures (–9%) and non-war-related expenditures (–11%) declined.

Ukraine’s labour market experiences all the challenges of a full-scale war. The economic shock of the beginning of the Russian invasion led to a drop in both demand and supply of labour. Businesses stopped hiring and people stopped applying for jobs. Later, demand for labour began to recover slowly. The number of people looking for a new job soared in the summer of 2022 and exceeded the average for 2021. However, the trends diverged from there: the need for labour was recovering along with the economic recovery, while the activity of job seekers was declining, not least due to Ukrainians’ migration abroad and mobilisation into the Defence Forces.

Labour market activity is gradually recovering after the holidays. At the end of 2025, both new job postings and new CVs fell to about 75–80% of the 2021 average. In early 2026, the market quickly emerged from this lull: employers became more active in posting vacancies, while jobseekers stepped up CV submissions.

In mid-January 2026, the number of new CVs increased quite sharply and, for the first time since 2022, exceeded pre-war levels. At the same time, the volume of new vacancies has fluctuated at around 80% of the pre-war level. Importantly, this does not mean that there are more vacancies than CVs. On average, there are 2.5 new CVs per new vacancy.

The State Statistics Service of Ukraine stopped publishing unemployment data when the full-scale war started. The Info Sapiens research agency makes its own estimates of the unemployment rate. According to these estimates, Ukraine’s unemployment rate declined slightly to 15.3% in April 2026. The proxy indicator of poverty — the share of respondents forced to cut spending on food — fell to 20.1% in April.

Given that neither the number of unemployed people nor the size of the working-age population is known with certainty, it is appropriate to analyse this unemployment estimate over time. We see that over the past few years Ukraine has experienced a decline in the unemployment rate, while the overall level of poverty has remained high.

In April 2026, the seasonally adjusted Business Activity Expectations Index (BAEI) improved to 49.7 and came very close to positive territory, but remained below the neutral level. The original BAEI data deteriorated slightly, although they stayed in positive territory. Seasonally adjusted data make it possible to see the underlying trends more clearly.

According to the NBU, business sentiment was affected negatively primarily by higher fuel prices.

Changes in business expectations are an important subjective indicator of the economic situation, signalling a gradual recovery or deterioration in business activity.

The Info Sapiens Consumer Sentiment Index stood at 76.9 points in April 2026, improving compared with January (73.5). An index reading below 100 means that negative consumer sentiment prevails among the population. The Consumer Sentiment Index consists of the Index of Economic Expectations (88.3 in April) and the Current Situation Index (59.9). Consumer sentiment improved in the spring, as it usually does. However, in April 2026 it remained weaker than in the same month of previous years.

Here we do not apply seasonal adjustment because, for consumer expectations, there are not enough observations, and the fluctuations are mostly unsystematic and not tied to the month of the year. This contrasts with businesses, whose expectations are shaped by more fundamental seasonal patterns in consumption, project cycles, agriculture, and so on.

Unfortunately, as of January 2026, Info Sapiens has discontinued its monthly consumer sentiment survey — updates will now be published on a quarterly basis.

In April 2026, Ukraine continued exporting electricity abroad. In total, around 33 GWh were exported during the month to Hungary, Moldova, and Romania. Hungary was the largest importer, purchasing around 21 GWh. However, export volumes remain insignificant: imports exceed exports by almost 17 times. Ukraine still has to import large amounts of electricity primarily because of the consequences of Russian attacks.

In April, rolling power outages resumed due to a combination of several factors. From 1 April, price caps returned to their previous, insufficient level, keeping electricity prices in Ukraine below European levels and making electricity imports unprofitable. The situation was further complicated by colder weather and lower solar generation.

In response to the electricity shortage and declining imports, on 23 April the NEURC adopted a new resolution, and from 30 April price caps were raised again to UAH 15,000/MWh. Price caps should be abolished altogether, but even this increase will help boost electricity imports.

In April, electricity imports fell to 558 GWh from 942 GWh in March. The largest suppliers were Hungary, Poland, and Romania (306, 125, and 124 GWh respectively). Moldova and Slovakia also supplied electricity (3 and 0.05 GWh respectively). Ukraine pays the market price for this electricity — it is not aid.

Prices on the day-ahead market (DAM) fell to UAH 5.7/kWh in April, after UAH 7.3/kWh in March and a peak of UAH 10.1/kWh in February. The decline was driven by lower demand after the end of the heating season.

As of 14 April, the spring sowing season has begun across all regions at the same pace as last year, with planted area almost unchanged from 2025. However, rising fuel (diesel up by 30 UAH) and fertiliser prices (up by 30–35%) have increased production costs.

The government has retained support programs for agricultural producers in 2026: the “5-7-9%” loan programme; partial reimbursement of agricultural machinery costs; agricultural insurance; guarantees for farmers with additional preferential terms for frontline territories; and demining.

Risks: fewer fertilisers and plant protection products could be applied, negatively impacting yields and resulting in lower harvests, food processing, and export volumes than in 2025, and driving inflationary pressures.

In March, metallurgical production grew by 20-40% m-o-m — depending on the product —amid improved energy situation and lower electricity costs.

According to metallurgical enterprises, CBAM measures led to losses of more than 1 mt in steel export orders and the closure of some production capacity.

Risks: weak external demand for Ukraine’s metallurgical production due to the global economic slowdown.

Household deposits interrupted their growth for the first time in a long while. In March, the volume of household deposits — both term deposits and demand deposits — fell by UAH 17.5 bn, or 2%, compared with February. This decline was very small; in annual terms, the volume of deposits increased by 22%. Still, the decline suggests that people are withdrawing money from deposits either to invest in more attractive assets (for example, domestic government bonds) or simply to cover their expenses. At the same time, hryvnia and FX demand deposits remain at a high level — more than 200% of their nominal 2021 level — indicating strong demand for liquidity.

Lending in Ukraine is growing rapidly and confidently. Credit growth is driven both by strong business demand and by competition among banks, which has led them to ease lending conditions. Consumer lending is also expanding quickly.

However, note that while deposits have already reached 200% of their 2021 nominal level, loans have not. A gap between deposits and lending remains. Banks still find it attractive to place funds in NBU deposit certificates.

We updated the corporate hryvnia loans index to reflect PrivatBank’s write-off of NPLs from Kolomoisky’s era.

According to preliminary NBU data, the balance of trade in goods and services remained negative in March 2026 at $-6.6 bn. In March, Ukraine imported a total of $11.5 bn. Of this amount, imports of goods accounted for $9.5 bn, while imports of services reached $2.0 bn. Exports totalled $4.9 bn, including $3.5 bn in goods exports and $1.4 bn in services exports.

The comments and data in this Tracker have been adapted for an international audience with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation.

We use ChatGPT while working on this page to help edit and translate texts. The author, economist Maksym Samoiliuk, is responsible for the quality of the final product.