Ukraine War Economy Tracker

The Economy Tracker provides regular updates on the state of Ukraine’s economy during the war, bringing together key indicators and charts in one place. Sections are updated on a rolling basis to reflect the latest data.

You may also be interested in our Monthly Economic Reviews, which feature a focused topic and bring together key experts for discussions.

After a 28.8% decline in 2022, Ukraine’s economy began to recover, although growth has gradually slowed. Following 5.5% growth in 2023, real GDP grew by 2.9% in 2024 and by 1.8% in 2025. Weaker economic performance largely reflected the impact of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure and other wartime challenges.

In Q1 2026, real GDP fell for the first time since 2023 — by 0.6% y-o-y or 0.7% q-o-q (seasonally adjusted). GDP declined due to the energy crisis caused by Russian attacks on energy infrastructure.

In May 2026, inflation slowed slightly to 0.9% m-o-m (after 1.4% in April). In annual terms, inflation eased from 8.6% y-o-y in April to 8.2% y-o-y in May. Ukraine entered the full-scale war with consumer inflation at 10% y-o-y.

Fuel prices (+38.7% y-o-y) will continue to put upward pressure on inflation. At the same time, the new harvest is likely to contain price growth, given the higher prices for fruit and vegetables recorded last year.

Over the past month, fruit prices increased the most, rising by 11.1%, largely due to the arrival of fresh strawberries on the market.

Prices also increased for bread, sunflower oil, pasta, fish and fish products, non-alcoholic beverages, beef, and sugar, by 1.2–6.4%.

Egg prices fell by 15.3%. Prices also declined for vegetables, milk, pork, butter, and lard, by 0.2–1.7%.

Transport prices rose by 0.7%, driven by higher fares for road passenger transport (+2.7%) and increases in fuel and lubricant prices (+0.6%).

The NBU kept the key policy rate at 15% at the Monetary Policy Committee meeting on 30 April 2026. The NBU postponed easing due to rising inflation risks and expectations at the start of 2026. It also stated that it stands ready to raise the rate if needed.

In May 2026, Ukraine’s FX reserves declined by 5.2% to $45.7 billion.

During the month, the NBU conducted FX interventions worth $3.2 billion to support the hryvnia exchange rate. Another $126 million was used for servicing and repaying foreign-currency debt.

At the same time, reserves received $599 million: $100 million from the placement of foreign-currency government bonds and $499 million through World Bank accounts. In addition, the value of financial instruments increased by $442 million due to revaluation effects. This $1 billion inflow was not enough to fully offset FX outflows, resulting in a decline in reserves.

The current record-high level of reserves is sufficient to cover 4.7 months of future imports, well above the benchmark of three months.

Since the second half of October 2025, the US dollar exchange rate — both the official NBU rate and the cash market rate — has been rising and has already approached UAH 45/$. This depreciation has been managed by the NBU, which continues to operate under a managed flexibility regime, intervening in the foreign exchange market to prevent excessive fluctuations. Sharp exchange rate movements remain unlikely given the adequate level of FX reserves, which enables the NBU to continue conducting such interventions.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, all domestic revenues of Ukraine’s state budget have gone to finance defence; these expenditures account for roughly half of the budget. Ukraine finances all civilian state budget expenditures with foreign financial assistance — in 2026, the need for such external financing is about $50 bn.

In 2026, Ukraine has already launched a new cooperation programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and received the first credit tranche of $1.5 bn. Ukraine also continues to receive funds under the ERA programme (financed from proceeds generated by frozen Russian assets) — $6.6 bn already in 2026.

In 2025, foreign aid covered 56% of Ukraine’s additional state budget needs, down from 73% in 2024. In 2025, the main source of external financing was the ERA programme — a mechanism for transferring proceeds from frozen Russian assets. In 2026, financing from the European Union under a large €90 bn loan will be crucial for Ukraine. The country expects the first tranche to be disbursed in June.

Total tax revenues rose 27% m-o-m to UAH 210 bn in May.

However, the monthly increase is largely seasonal: UAH 68.6 bn came from corporate profit tax (CPT) – as Q1 filings fall due in May. This is 1.5x higher y-o-y, partly reflecting post-fuel-crisis economy recovery.

Personal income tax revenues also increased: edged up 2% m-o-m and 21% y-o-y to UAH 36.7 bn. This is consistent with real wage growth (avg. salary: UAH 25,160 in April 2025 → UAH 30,515 in April 2026  per State Statistics Service).

Revenues from other taxes weakened, especially against the backdrop of reduced consumption following the fuel crisis.

Import VAT — the largest non-seasonal revenue source — fell 7% m-o-m to UAH 53.1bn, tracking an import contraction ($9.8bn → $7.3bn, led by fuel).

After nominal war spending declined 1% y-o-y in Q1 2026 amid tight budget resources, April saw a rebound to UAH 373 bn (UAH 297 bn domestic-funded  – 1.6x  y-o-y  + UAH 76 bn defence aid — 2x  y-o-y ). However, the defence spending plan from the General Fund for January–April was only 80% fulfilled.

The Q1 pattern reflects front-loaded fiscal constraints rather than reduced commitment; the March–April acceleration is a catch-up effect.

Security and defence remain the dominant priority at ~63% of war spending.

Social protection holds second place at 7.5% of the total state budget  (UAH 41 bn in April, +UAH 2 bn m-o-m).

The sharpest non-military increase was debt servicing — UAH 38 bn, 2.4x m-o-m — driven by domestic bond obligations, with elevated payments expected through at least June.

Ukraine’s labour market experiences all the challenges of a full-scale war. The economic shock of the beginning of the Russian invasion led to a drop in both demand and supply of labour. Businesses stopped hiring and people stopped applying for jobs. Later, demand for labour began to recover slowly. The number of people looking for a new job soared in the summer of 2022 and exceeded the average for 2021. However, the trends diverged from there: the need for labour was recovering along with the economic recovery, while the activity of job seekers was declining, not least due to Ukrainians’ migration abroad and mobilisation into the Defence Forces.

In mid-January 2026, the number of new CVs increased sharply and, for the first time since 2022, exceeded pre-war levels. However, it later fell back to around 90% of the 2021 level. Meanwhile, the number of new job postings has fluctuated between 80% and 90% of its 2021 level. Importantly, this does not mean there are more vacancies than CVs. On average, each new vacancy receives about 2.5 new CVs.

The State Statistics Service of Ukraine stopped publishing unemployment data when the full-scale war started. The Info Sapiens research agency makes its own estimates of the unemployment rate. According to these estimates, Ukraine’s unemployment rate declined slightly to 15.3% in April 2026. The proxy indicator of poverty — the share of respondents forced to cut spending on food — fell to 20.1% in April.

Given that neither the number of unemployed people nor the size of the working-age population is known with certainty, it is appropriate to analyse this unemployment estimate over time. We see that over the past few years Ukraine has experienced a decline in the unemployment rate, while the overall level of poverty has remained high.

In May 2026, the seasonally adjusted Business Activity Expectations Index (BAEI) improved slightly to 49.8, remaining just below the neutral threshold but close to positive territory. The original BAEI data also improved slightly and remained in positive territory. Seasonally adjusted data provide a clearer picture of underlying trends.

According to the NBU, business sentiment benefited primarily from the stable situation in the energy sector.

Changes in business expectations are an important subjective indicator of the economic situation, signalling a gradual recovery or deterioration in business activity.

The Info Sapiens Consumer Sentiment Index stood at 76.9 points in April 2026, improving compared with January (73.5). An index reading below 100 means that negative consumer sentiment prevails among the population. The Consumer Sentiment Index consists of the Index of Economic Expectations (88.3 in April) and the Current Situation Index (59.9). Consumer sentiment improved in the spring, as it usually does. However, in April 2026 it remained weaker than in the same month of previous years.

Here we do not apply seasonal adjustment because, for consumer expectations, there are not enough observations, and the fluctuations are mostly unsystematic and not tied to the month of the year. This contrasts with businesses, whose expectations are shaped by more fundamental seasonal patterns in consumption, project cycles, agriculture, and so on.

Unfortunately, as of January 2026, Info Sapiens has discontinued its monthly consumer sentiment survey — updates will now be published on a quarterly basis.

In May 2026, Ukraine significantly increased its electricity exports to 94 GWh, up from 33 GWh in April. The increase was driven by seasonal growth in solar power generation and lower domestic demand. Hungary was the largest importer of Ukrainian electricity, purchasing around 60 GWh, followed by Moldova and Romania with 18 GWh and 16 GWh, respectively.

Despite the rise in exports, imports still exceeded exports by a factor of 4.2, meaning that Ukraine remained a net importer of electricity. The country continues to rely heavily on electricity imports primarily because of the damage caused by Russian attacks.

Export volumes could have been significantly higher if not for the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — the EU’s carbon levy on imports of carbon-intensive goods, which entered into full force on 1 January 2026. According to Forbes Ukraine, Ukrainian electricity exporters lost around $26 million in revenue in the first quarter due to CBAM.

On 1 May, the electricity price caps were raised to UAH 15,000/MWh, restoring access to imports during periods of supply shortages. Despite this change, imports fell to 397 GWh in May from 558 GWh in April due to lower electricity demand and higher solar power generation. Hungary, Romania, and Poland were the largest suppliers, exporting 206 GWh, 97 GWh, and 91 GWh to Ukraine, respectively. Moldova and Slovakia supplied only marginal volumes of 1.4 GWh and 1 GWh.

The price caps should be abolished altogether. However, even this increase allows the market to respond more flexibly to supply shortages. Ukraine pays the market price for imported electricity — it is not aid.

Day-ahead market (DAM) prices fell to UAH 5.2/kWh in May, down from UAH 5.7/kWh in April and the peak of UAH 10.1/kWh recorded in February. The decline was driven by higher solar power generation and lower electricity demand outside the heating season.

As of 15 June, 98% of spring crops or 5,9 million hectares have been sown, which is slightly higher than up to the same date in 2025 (5,7 million hectares) due to the need to replant winter crops lost in the extremely cold winter.

The conditions for winter crops are better than in 2025 across most of the country, thanks to sufficient soil moisture reserves. However, the recent rainfall and the cold start of summer have created favourable conditions for the diseases.

The total harvest of grains and oilseeds is expected to reach 81–83 million tons, with 60-61 million tons of grain, according to the Ministry of Economy.

USDA improved Ukraine’s wheat harvest forecast for 2026/2027 MY by 0,5 million tons to 23,5 million tons and an unchanged corn harvest forecast (30 million tons), despite risks to yields due to a lack of fertilisers.

The Ministry of Economy updated the procedure for the duty-free export of soybeans and rapeseed.

In May, metallurgical production grew by 15-22% m-o-m. However, in Jan – May it remained lower by 1-7% y-o-y amid competition with China and Turkey dumped imports and CBAM regulations, which reduced EU demand for Ukrainian metallurgical products.

The Interagency Commission on International Trade has initiated an anti-dumping investigation into metallurgical imports from Turkey, Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, and India.

Ukrzaliznytsia plans to increase freight tariffs by at least 45% in 2026 due to rising repair costs for damaged infrastructure and debt service. However, it will cover about half of the expected UAH 26 bn deficit. Agricultural and metallurgical companies warn that a sharp increase in transportation costs could reduce the competitiveness of Ukrainian products on global markets and hurt exports.

Household deposits resumed growth after a slight decline in March. Demand deposits in both hryvnia and foreign currency remain at elevated levels — more than 200% of their nominal 2021 value — indicating strong demand for liquidity.

Lending in Ukraine is growing rapidly and confidently. Credit growth is driven both by strong business demand and by competition among banks, which has led them to ease lending conditions. Consumer lending is also expanding quickly.

However, note that while deposits have already reached 200% of their 2021 nominal level, loans have not. A gap between deposits and lending remains. Banks still find it attractive to place funds in NBU deposit certificates.

We updated the corporate hryvnia loans index to reflect PrivatBank’s write-off of NPLs from Kolomoisky’s era.

According to preliminary NBU data, Ukraine recorded a negative balance of trade in goods and services of $6.0 billion in April 2026. Total imports amounted to $10.9 billion, including $8.9 billion in goods and $2.0 billion in services. Exports reached $4.9 billion, of which $3.5 billion came from goods and $1.4 billion from services.

The comments and data in this Tracker have been adapted for an international audience with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation.

We use ChatGPT while working on this page to help edit and translate texts. The author, economist Maksym Samoiliuk, is responsible for the quality of the final product.